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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. : 
ERNESTO ALVEREZ, : Case No. 20050468-SC 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court granted Alverez's Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Utah Court of 
Appeals opinion in State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, 111 P.3d 808. The court of 
appeals' opinion in Alverez is attached hereto as Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred 
on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the totality of the circumstances created a reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity justifying the detention of Mr. Alverez. See attached Order 
dated September 21, 2005 in Addendum B. 
Issue: Whether the totality of the circumstances at the time the police officers 
conducted their search was supported by probable cause. Id. 
Issue: Whether the force used to obtain evidence from the defendant's mouth was 
reasonable. Id 
1 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of 
appeals and not that of the district court." State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,117, 112 P.3d 
507 (quoting State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,1J11, 103 P.3d 699). This Court reviews the 
decision of the court of appeals for correctness. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of the following constitutional and statutory provisions are provided in 
full in Addendum C. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Alverez was charged with two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance or Counterfeit Substance with the Intent to Distribute, second degree felonies, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (2002). Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at 
U6; R. 1-2. Mr. Alverez filed a motion to suppress the evidence arguing that the officers' 
warrantless search was constitutionally impermissible. Id.; R. 32-34. At the conclusion 
of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion. Id.; R. 43-46; 
88:38. Mr. Alverez filed a petition for interlocutory review of the trial court's decision 
which the court of appeals denied. Id at 117; R. 47-48; 54-59; 88:39. 
On January 5, 2004, Mr. Alverez entered into a conditional guilty plea pursuant to 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), wherein he pled guilty to one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled/counterfeit substance with the intent to distribute, a 
2 
second degree felony offense. Id.; R. 62-71. 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Mr. Alverez's 
motion to suppress in a 2-1 published decision. Id. at H34. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 23, 2003, Officer Don Wahlin and another officer with the Salt Lake City 
Police Department were observing a condominium complex on 2450 Elizabeth Street 
because they had "heard there were drug dealings in this [general] area."1 Id. at 112; R. 
88:3-4, 9. Officer Wahlin testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he did not have 
any specific information that drug dealings were going on in this particular complex but 
was just taking "a chance that day to see if anything was going to come in and out of 
there." R. 88:9. While observing the complex, the officers saw a vehicle pull up. Id; R. 
88:4. Wahlin testified that he recognized this vehicle as one he "had received information 
on from [his] narcotics department report that was possibly dealing drugs." Id.; R. 88:3. 
Wahlin testified that the narcotics report was based on "someone" who had called in to 
report alleged drug sales near his or her residence around "2nd South and Douglas Street" 
and reported observing this vehicle in that area which is approximately twenty blocks 
away from the complex in question. R. 88:9-10. 
The officers observed Mr. Alverez get out of the vehicle, go somewhere into the 
!The probable cause statement indicates that the complex's address is 2430 South 
Elizabeth Street instead of 2450 as indicated in the motion to suppress hearing. R.2 To 
the extent that this number represents the whole condominium complex, the address is 
cited as given in the motion to suppress hearing. 
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complex and in less than five minutes return to the vehicle and leave. Id.; R. 88:4. Based 
on the short stay and the previous "information" Wahlin had received, he believed a drug 
transaction occurred. Id; R. 88:4, 10. "Although Wahlin discovered that day that the 
vehicle was uninsured, he and the other officer chose not to initiate a traffic stop on that 
basis." Id 
The next day, Wahlin and Sergeant Chad Steed, also with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, went back to the complex to see whether this same vehicle would return 
because Wahlin has "found it[] typical for [drug dealers] to frequent the same location." 
Id. at P ; R. 88:3-4. The officers observed the vehicle pull into the same area of the 
complex and Mr. Alverez get out and walk somewhere into the complex. Id,; R. 88:4, 21. 
The officers could not see what area or which unit in the complex Mr. Alverez was 
going. R. 88:13, 15, 32. Nor did they try to ascertain into which unit Mr. Alverez was 
going. R. 88:13-15, 32. Instead, the officers pulled their unmarked vehicle around to 
where the vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving was parked. R. 88:4, 21,31. The officers got 
out of their vehicle and waited next to the vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving to see whether 
he would return in the same manner as previously observed. Id at H 3; R. 88:4, 21, 31. 
While waiting for Mr. Alverez to return, Steed noticed "a small bottle of water in 
the console of the vehicle" which Steed has "seen [individuals believed to have narcotics] 
use . . . to swallow drugs that they contain in their mouths." R. 88:29. Steed also 
observed a facsimile of "Jesus Malverde" which Steed has seen before in drug houses and 
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"[according to the people that [he had] talked to [Jesus Malverde is] the patron saint of 
drug dealing."2 R. 88:22,29. 
The officers stood next to the vehicle behind a full-size van waiting for Mr. 
Alverez to return. Id, at U3; R. 88:5-6, 15, 21. As Mr. Alverez came around the van, the 
officers confronted him. Id. at 1[5; R. 88:5-6, 15, 21. "Initially, when [Wahlin] stopped 
[Mr. Alverez he] asked him if he knew the vehicle that he was driving was uninsured." 
Id at U5; R. 88:6, 15-16. Mr. Alverez responded "How'd you know that?" Id; R. 88:6, 
16. Wahlin "then went on to explain to [Mr. Alverez] that this vehicle that he was driving 
had been suspected of being a vehicle involved in some drug dealing activities." Id; R. 
88:6, 16. Mr. Alverez "stated he knew nothing of that." Id; R. 88:6. Wahlin then 
proceeded to ask Mr. Alverez "if he had any drugs on his person." Id; R. 88:6, 16. Mr. 
Alverez responded "No." Id; R. 88:6, 17. 
While talking with Mr. Alverez, Wahlin did not have difficulty understanding him 
nor did he notice any unsightly or unusual bulges in Mr. Alverez's mouth. Id; R. 88:16. 
In fact, Wahlin thought Mr. Alverez "talked quite well" and did not notice Mr. Alverez 
put anything into his mouth or do anything he would consider unusual. Id at U1J 5, 23; R. 
88:16-17, 19. Wahlin "then asked [Mr. Alverez] if he minded opening up his mouth to 
show [Wahlin] he didn't have any drugs in his mouth." Id. at U5; R. 88:6, 17. Wahlin 
stated that this is a standard question he asks of people he perceives to be drug dealers. 
2The trial court gave "very little weight" under the totality of the circumstances to 
the bottle of water and the facsimile. R. 88:38. 
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Id.; R. 88:18. Wahlin thought Mr. Alverez became nervous when asked this question. 
Id.; R. 88:18. Wahlin then "began to . . . observe[] [Mr. Alverez] attempting to move 
some objects . . . in his mouth and then . . . [Wahlin] could see some swallowing motion 
going on." IcL; R. 88:7, 30. Although Mr. Alverez's "mouth was closed," Wahlin "could 
see things . . .in the pit of Mr. Alverez's lip area" that looked "like his tongue and moving 
other objects in attempting to swallow at that time." Id.; R. 88:7, 19. Steed only noticed 
that Mr. Alverez "just appeared that he was attempting to swallow." R. 88:30. Wahlin 
and Steed immediately grabbed one of Mr. Alverez's arms and put him in a wrist lock, 
bending him forward telling him "to spit out what he had in his mouth." Id.; R. 88:7-8, 
30-31. Mr. Alverez then spit out 15 balloons containing drugs. Id; R. 88:7, 31. The 
time that passed between Wahlin asking to search Mr. Alverez's mouth until Mr. Alverez 
was forced to spit out the balloons was between five to 10 seconds. Id,; R. 88:8, 17. 
On appeal, Alverez claimed that the officers "unconstitutionally exceeded the 
scope of their initial encounter with [him] when Wahlin, without reasonable suspicion to 
do so, questioned [him] about drugs." Id at 119. Alverez also argued that even if the 
court concluded that officers had reasonable suspicion to question him about drags, the 
officers were not justified in conducting a forcible warrantless bodily search. IdL The 
state argued that Alverez's detention was a level-one encounter which does not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at H10 n.2. The court of appeals' majority opinion expressly 
declined to make a determination about whether the level of the encounter constituted a 
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seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The court analyzed the case as if the detention 
was a level two seizure concluding "the outcome of the [Alverez's] appeal would be the 
same regardless of our conclusion on the issue." Id 
The majority concluded that it was "clear that, under 'the totality of the 
circumstances,' [the officers] had 'specific and articulable facts which . . . warranted [the] 
detention' of [Alverez] and to question him about the uninsured status of the vehicle and 
about drugs." Id. at 1114. The majority opinion also concluded that the totality of these 
circumstances along with the circumstances that arose when the officers questioned 
Alverez about drugs justified the officers' belief "that there was 'a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found'" in Alverez's mouth. Id. at HI 9. 
Relying on its opinion in Hodson I, the majority found that these factors created exigent 
circumstances allowing the officers to forcibly search Alverez. Id. at U26. The majority 
found that the forcible search "was a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner." 
Id, at t l 27, 32. 
The dissent disagreed that the police officers "had the required reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to question Alverez about drugs . . . . " Id. at [^36. The dissent 
concluded that "because the 'information' upon which the officers based their suspicions 
originated outside of the officers' own observations, and because the State failed to 
develop any articulable factual basis substantiating this 'information,' the information 
d[id] not provide a legally cognizable factual basis for the officers' suspicion about 
7 
Alverez." IcLatt37. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals opinion because the totality of the 
circumstances in this case did not create a reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. 
Alverez was involved in drug activity. The officers conducted a level two detention of 
Mr. Alverez based on their suspicion that the vehicle he was driving lacked insurance. 
However, the officers exceeded the scope of their initial detention when they began 
questioning Mr. Alverez regarding drugs without a reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity. The state failed to establish that the information relied on by the 
officers supported a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alverez was engaged in drug activity. 
The totality of the circumstances failed to establish a reasonable suspicion that Mr. 
Alverez was involved in drug activity permitting the officers to exceed the scope of their 
initial detention. Therefore, the officers1 additional questions regarding drugs violated the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Even if this Court were to determine that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of 
drug activity allowing them to exceed the scope of their initial detention, this Court 
should reverse because the totality of the circumstances did not give the officers probable 
cause to conduct a forcible bodily search. The state failed to establish by probable cause 
that there was a "clear indication" that drugs would be found in Mr. Alverez's mouth. The 
state also failed to show that exigent circumstances justified their warrantless search since 
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it presented no evidence that if the balloons of drugs were swallowed they would not be 
susceptible to identification or recovery. 
Finally, this court should reverse because the force used by the officers to obtain 
evidence was not reasonable in this case. The state failed to present any evidence that the 
method of searching Mr. Alverez was reasonable given the circumstances. In fact, the 
circumstances demonstrated that there was no compelling need for this search because the 
officers had little more than a hunch that evidence of a crime would be found and there 
were other available constitutional methods of conducting the search that were ignored. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TOTALITY OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CREATE A REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT MR. ALVEREZ WAS INVOLVED 
IN DRUG ACTIVITY. 
The court of appeals' majority first expressly declined to make a determination 
about whether the level of the officers' initial encounter constituted a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment, concluding "the outcome of the [Alverez's] appeal would be the 
same regardless of our conclusion on the issue." Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at [^10, n.2. 
The majority then went on to determine that their "review of the record reveals that [the 
officers] had knowledge of the following 'specific and articulable facts' and made the 
following 'rational inference from those facts,' which warranted engaging Defendant in a 
level two encounter to ask him about the potential insurance violation and about drugs." 
Id. at 1J13. However, while the officers did have a reasonable suspicion to conduct a level 
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two detention of Mr. Alverez to question him about the lack of insurance on the vehicle 
he was driving, they did not have the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion to 
question him about drugs. 
A. A Level Two Seizure Occurs When Under the Totality of the Circumstances 
A Reasonable Person Would Believe He is Not Free to Leave. 
The officers in this case had the requisite suspicion to engage Mr. Alverez in a 
level two detention regarding their belief that the vehicle he was driving lacked insurance. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (1998) ("Utah law makes it a class B misdemeanor for 
a driver to knowingly operate an uninsured motor vehicle on the highways of the state."). 
Under a level-two encounter "an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the "detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (quoting State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)); see also United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983); State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, Tfll, 999 P.2d 7 ("a 
stop is justified only if there is a reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in criminal 
activity."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (2003) (officer must have reasonable suspicion to 
stop person in a public place and request name, address and explanation of actions). 
There is no bright line test for what is, or is not, reasonable 
suspicion. IcL Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion 
depends on the "totality of the circumstances." Id (citations 
omitted). The "totality of the circumstances" analysis must be 
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based upon all the circumstances and must "raise a suspicion 
that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in 
wrongdoing." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 
101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (emphasis added). 
Put differently, the officers must have a "particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity by the 
particular person detained." State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 941 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 
S.Ct. at 694-95). 
Steward, 806 P.2d at 215-16 (emphasis added); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 
CtApp. 1987). 
A level two "seizure under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable 
person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. This 
is true 'even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief.'" Salt 
Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ^ fl 1, 998 P.2d 274 (quotations and citations omitted). 
In this case, officers conducted a level two detention of Mr. Alverez when questioning 
him regarding the lack of insurance on the vehicle he was driving. Under the totality of 
the circumstances, Mr. Alverez would not have believed he was free to leave. Those 
circumstances included the officers stepping out from behind the full size van as Mr. 
Alverez came around it attempting to approach his vehicle. R. 88:5-6, 15, 21. Both 
officers were wearing full uniforms. R. 88:2. Wahlin then subjected Mr. Alverez to a 
series of accusatory questions that indicated he was suspected of being engaged in illegal 
activity. See State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^ [14, 17 P.3d 1135 (Hansen I) reversed 
in part on other grounds Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650; In re J.G, 726 A.2d 948, 953 
11 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (recognizing that "[generally, courts throughout the 
country have ruled that a field inquiry becomes a Terry stop upon 'unsupported outright 
accusations of criminal activity.'"); R. 88:6, 15-16. 
Wahlin initially asked whether Mr. Alverez "knew the vehicle that he was driving 
was uninsured." R. 88:6, 15. The officers never indicated that Mr. Alverez was going to 
be cited for not having insurance, never asked Mr. Alverez for his name or for his 
identification or even if the vehicle belonged to him. See Hansen I, 2000 UT App 353 at 
1J15 ("[T]he fact that [the officer] had not addressed one of the reasons for the initial stop, 
a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter."). Rather, after 
Mr. Alverez inquired how Wahlin knew that the vehicle was uninsured, Wahlin 
immediately told Mr. Alverez that the "vehicle that he was driving had been suspected of 
being a vehicle involved in some drug dealing activities." R. 88:6, 16. Wahlin then 
proceeded to ask Mr. Alverez "if he had any drugs on his person." R. 88:6, 16. When 
Mr. Alverez responded "No," Wahlin asked if he would open "his mouth to show him 
that he didn't have any drugs " R. 88:6, 17. 
Because these were not simply questions posed to Mr. Alverez which he was free 
to disregard and walk away, he was seized for the purposes implicating the Fourth 
Amendment the moment the officers detained him with a question regarding the vehicle's 
lack of insurance. However, the officers impermissibly exceeded the scope of that initial 
detention by questioning Mr. Alverez regarding drugs without the requisite reasonable 
12 
articulable suspicion necessary in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
B. Additional Questions That Further Detained Mr. Alverez Must Have Been 
Supported by Reasonable Suspicion of More Serious Criminal Activity. 
Once a level two detention is made, "[t]he length and scope of the detention must 
be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quotations and citations 
omitted). In order to justify exceeding the scope of the initial detention the officers "must 
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion." IcL at 764 
(quotations and citations omitted); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) 
(reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts from the total 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop). "Anything less would invite 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches " Sery, 758 P.2d at 941 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). 
"[T]he State bears the initial burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative stop." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 
1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). If the officers' expanded detention is not justified by 
an articulable suspicion that the individual has committed a crime, the Fourth Amendment 
is violated by the additional intrusion. Id 
In determining whether a "seizure is constitutionally reasonable, [this Court] must 
first determine whether the officers['] action[s were] justified at [their] inception." State 
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v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) (quotations and citations omitted). "If so, 
[this Court] then considers] whether the resulting detention was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." Id. 
(quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, "once a stop is made, the detention 'must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" 
Id. at 452 (quotations and citations omitted). 
In this case, questions that would be "reasonably related" to the scope of the 
detention would be limited to those types of questions that would assist the officers in 
ascertaining information regarding the vehicle's insurance status. Instead, Wahlin's 
questioning regarding the vehicle's insurance was limited to one accusatory statement. 
Wahlin never asked Mr. Alverez for an explanation regarding the vehicle's lack of 
insurance, or identification, or whether he in fact owned the vehicle. Nor did Wahlin 
indicate how the vehicle's lack of insurance was going to be handled. Rather, Wahlin 
immediately told Mr. Alverez that the "vehicle he was driving had been suspected of 
being a vehicle involved in some drug dealing activities." R. 88:6, 16. Wahlin then 
proceeded to ask Mr. Alverez "if he had any drugs on his person" and "if he minded 
opening up his mouth to show [Wahlin] he didn't have any drugs in his mouth." R. 88:6, 
16-17. 
Questions pertaining to Mr. Alverez's suspected involvement in drug activity 
exceeded the scope justifying the initial stop. "Investigative questioning that further 
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detains [an individual] must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. The officers "must be able to articulate a 
particularized and objective basis for their suspicions that is drawn from the totality of 
circumstances facing them at the time of the seizure." State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 
435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). More specifically, the officers must have a "particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity by the particular person detained." Sery, 
758 P.2d at 941 (emphasis added) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. at 694-
95). 
Nothing in Mr. Alverez's conduct or response regarding the vehicle's insurance 
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. The information the 
officers possessed was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alverez 
was or had engaged in criminal activity relating to drugs. The majority opinion, however, 
determined that the totality of factors gave the officers reasonable suspicion to question 
Mr. Alverez about drugs in addition to the vehicles lack of insurance. Alverez, 2005 UT 
App 145 at ]f 13. According to the court, those factors included: a condominium complex 
under observation by the officers because they had heard there were drug dealings in this 
general area,3 the officers observation of a vehicle that pulled up to the complex which 
The officers did not have any specific information that drug dealings were going on in 
this particular complex but were taking "a chance that day to see if anything was going to 
come in and out of there." R. 88:9. 
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was listed in a narcotic department report as one "possibly dealing drugs,"4 the officers' 
observation of Mr. Alverez "get[ting] out of the vehicle, entering] the complex, 
returning] to the vehicle less than five minutes later, get[ting] back into the vehicle, and 
driv[ing] the vehicle out of the complex," and Wahlin's belief that a drug transaction 
occurred because this visit was consistent with short-stay drug traffic. Id at ^[13; R. 88:4, 
10. 
Additional factors included: Wahlin and Steed's observations of the complex the 
next day to see whether this same vehicle would return; The officers' observation of the 
vehicle pulling into the same area of the complex and Mr. Alverez getting out and 
walking somewhere into the complex;5 Steed's observation of "a small bottle of water in 
the console of the vehicle, which he had seen suspected drug dealers use during traffic 
stops to swallow drugs concealed in their mouths;" and a "facsimile of 'Jesus Malverde,' 
which Steed recognized to be the patron said of drug dealing." Id.; R. 88:3-4, 21. 
Contrary to the majority's determination, none of these factors created a 
"particularized and objective basis for suspecting" that Mr. Alverez was engaged in 
4
 The only evidence presented by the state regarding this report was that it was based upon 
a telephone call from "somebody . . . reporting] drug sales near her place" which was 
"2nd South and Douglas Street where the vehicle was observed." R. 88:9-10. This 
address is approximately 20 blocks away from the complex being observed on 2450 
Elizabeth Street. 
5
 The officers could not see what area or which unit in the complex Mr. Alverez was 
going, nor did they try to ascertain into which unit Mr. Alverez was going. R. 88:13-15, 
32. 
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criminal activity. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The State 
failed in its burden of establishing the articulable factual basis for the reasonable 
suspicion justifying the additional detention. As recognized by the dissent, under the 
majority opinion's view, "the articulable factual basis the officers had for suspecting that 
Alverez was involved in illegal drug-related activity is supported mainly by two pieces of 
information that originated from sources outside of the officers5 own observations." 
Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at 1137. 
The officers in this case began their initial observation of the condominium 
complex solely because of the unexplained "information" they had about 
drug transactions taking place in that area. Likewise, they only took an 
interest in Alverez because of the "information" they had that his vehicle 
had possibly been involved in drug transactions. . . Without the 
"information" tying Alverez to illegal drug transactions, the remaining 
circumstances the officers relied on to justify questioning Alverez about his 
involvement in drug trafficking, as well as to justify the subsequent 
warrantless search of Alverez's mouth, wholly fail to provide an articulable 
factual basis for the officers' actions. 
Id at 1142. 
"The specific and articulable facts required to support reasonable suspicion are 
most frequently based on an investigating officer's own observations and inferences, but 
under certain circumstances the officer may rely on other sources of information." Case, 
884 P.2d at 1276-77 (internal citations omitted). If an officer does rely on external 
information received from other law enforcement sources, "the [s]tate must introduce . . . 
evidence showing the informant's [information] was reliable, provided sufficient detail of 
criminal activity, and could be corroborated by police." Kohl 2000 UT 35 at 1114. "[A]n 
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informant's Veracity/ 'reliability,1 and 'basis of knowledge1 are all highly relevant in 
determining the value of his report." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). 
However, these elements should be viewed under the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists. Id,; State v. Saddler, 
2004 UT 105, Ull , 104 P.3d 1265. 
In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), an anonymous caller reported that a young 
black man standing at a bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. Id, at 268. 
The record revealed no information about the informant. Id, Other than the tip, the 
officers had no reason to suspect the defendant was involved in illegal activity. Id, 
Despite this, the officers approached the defendant, frisked him and seized a gun. Id, 
The Supreme Court determined that the tip regarding a gun "arose not from any 
observations of [the officers] but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an 
unknown caller." Id, at 270. "Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can 
be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, 
'an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or 
veracity.'" Id, (citations omitted). The Supreme Court concluded that the anonymous and 
unsubstantiated tip cannot justify the detention where "[t]he reasonable suspicion here at 
issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to 
identify a determinate person." Id. at 272. 
As discussed by the dissent in Alverez, 
In Case an officer received a dispatch call directing him to a specific area to 
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investigate a possible car prowl or car burglary. See 884 P.2d at 1275. The 
dispatcher described the suspect as a male in a white tee shirt, possibly 
Hispanic, with a "chunky" build. Id. Based on that information, the officer 
stopped a vehicle leaving the area that was carrying a passenger that 
appeared to fit the description. See id. During the course of the officer's 
stop, he detected an odor of alcohol on the breath of the vehicle's driver, 
whom he subsequently arrested for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. See id. The driver claimed that the officer, acting on the radio 
dispatch, lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop his car and that any evidence 
obtained during the stop was illegal. See id. The trial court denied the 
driver's motion to suppress the evidence, but [the court of appeals] reversed 
the denial of the driver's motion. See id at 1278. Because the State failed to 
establish any reasonable, articulable suspicion underlying the issuance of 
the bulletin, no such suspicion supported making the stop. See id. One was 
left to speculate as to the source of, or the reason for, the dispatcher's 
instruction to the investigating officer. See id. In Case, [the court of 
appeals] held that "[m]erely providing descriptive information to an officer 
about whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are 
no articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop was to be made." 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at 1139 (Orme, J. dissent). 
Similar to the information in J.L. and Case, the state failed to introduce any 
evidence showing that the information relied on by the officers regarding either the report 
of drug transactions in the general area or the vehicle "was reliable, provided sufficient 
detail of criminal activity, [or was] corroborated by police." Kohl 2000 UT 35 at If 14. 
In fact, the record indicates that the officers did not have any specific information 
that drugs were being sold anywhere in this particular complex, rather they had just been 
told about drug activity in "the Elizabeth Street area of that south." R. 88:9. The officers 
focused on this particular complex because they were "just [taking] a chance that day to 
see if anything was going to come in and out of there." R. 88:9. While watching the 
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complex on July 23 r , Wahlin observed Mr. Alverez enter the complex and return to the 
vehicle in less than five minutes. R. 88:4. Although, Wahlin testified he believed that a 
drug transaction had occurred at some unit in the complex, no attempt was made to verify 
his hunch. R. 88:13. In fact, both Wahlin and Steed testified that they could not see 
which area of the complex Mr. Alverez approached or which of the many units he may 
have entered nor did they make any attempt to find out. R. 88:13-15, 31-32. Rather than 
investigate, the officers "chose to deal with [Mr. Alverez]" directly. R. 88:14. In directly 
dealing with Mr. Alverez, the officers did not notice anything unusual about his behavior 
or speech that raised their suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. Wahlin 
testified that he did not have any difficulty understanding Mr. Alverez or notice any 
unusual bulges in his mouth. R. 88:16-17. In fact, Wahlin thought Mr. Alverez "talked 
quite well." R. 88:19. 
Moreover, in directly dealing with Mr. Alverez the officers did not ask him any 
questions within the scope of the initial detention that would have helped determine 
whether his answers raised their suspicion of criminal activity. The officers did not take 
any action to determine whether Mr. Alverez was the actual individual connected with the 
vehicle suspected of drug activity. For example, the officers could have asked Mr. 
Alverez if he in fact owned the vehicle under suspicion. The officers also could have 
asked for his name or requested identification which would have assisted in determining 
whether Mr. Alverez was the individual registered as the owner of the vehicle. 
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Requesting identification would have also allowed the officers to determine whether Mr. 
Alverez actually resided in the complex or allowed them to ask him regarding his purpose 
in visiting. However, nothing was done to corroborate or confirm the veracity of this 
report. 
The state failed to establish the reliability of the information reported and failed to 
show that the officers corroborated the report. Due to the state's failure to present any 
evidence regarding the "information" on which these reports relied, there is no indication 
as to whether the informant made any personal observations or had first-hand knowledge 
concerning the alleged drug sales. In sum, there is no indication as to whether the 
information was based on a mere hunch, a casual rumor or an unconfirmed report from an 
unidentified third party. 
Hence, "[t]he only circumstances left to justify any encounter between Alverez and 
the officers was the officers' knowledge that Alverez's vehicle was uninsured, the 
officers' observations of the picture of Jesus Malverde and the water bottle in Alverez's 
vehicle, Alverez's two visits to the complex, and Alverez's nervous behavior when" asked 
by Officer Wahlin if he would open his mouth to show him that he didn't have any drugs 
in it. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at U43 (Orme, J., dissent); R. 88:6, 17. As discussed 
above, the totality of these circumstances did not "give the officers the required 
reasonable suspicion to detain Alverez and question him about drugs." Id 
The officers did not observe anything unusual about Mr. Alverez's behavior or 
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speech when questioning him about the vehicle's lack of insurance, they did not observe 
any contact consistent with a drug buy, or observe anything to suggest that he was 
engaging in any type of drug activity. The ambiguous observations made by officers 
previous to detaining him coupled with their failure to corroborate the reports failed to 
provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to allow the officers to question Mr. Alverez 
concerning drugs. The officers had no more than a "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch" that Mr. Alverez was dealing drugs, and failed to take any action that 
might have confirmed or dispelled their hunch. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (quolations and 
citations omitted). Therefore, the officers' questions regarding drugs exceeded the 
permissible scope of the initial detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TOTALITY OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT GIVE THE OFFICERS PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO CONDUCT A FORCIBLE BODILY SEARCH. 
Even if this Court determines that reasonable suspicion existed for the officers to 
question Mr. Alverez about suspected drug activities, the evidence seized by the officers 
should have been excluded because Mr. Alverez's Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated when the officers forcibly conducted a warrantless search of his person without 
the necessary showing of probable cause. 
Unless a governmental agency has secured a valid warrant to conduct a search, 
searches "are/?er se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment- subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 
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1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The "well-
delineated" exception at issue here required the state to establish that "exigent 
circumstances" existed justifying a forcible bodily search. City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 
P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-72, 86 
S. Ct. 1826, 1834-36 (1966). In finding exceptions to the warrant requirement, c[t]he 
State bears [a] particularly heavy burden" of persuasion. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In order to meet this burden in the case of a bodily search, the State must 
establish three elements: (1) a clear indication that evidence would be 
found; (2) exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily 
intrusion; and (3) that the method chosen was a reasonable one, performed 
in a reasonable manner. 
State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), reversed on other grounds, 907 
P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995) (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-72). A review of the three 
prongs of the Schmerber test shows that the State failed to meet its burden to justify the 
warrantless bodily search of Mr. Alverez. 
A. Officers Did Not Have A "Clear Indication " That Evidence Would Be 
Found. 
Given that warrantless searches and seizures must be justified by probable cause, 
and that the expectation of privacy one has in one's body is the highest recognized under 
the Constitution, the Schmerber prerequisite to a search that there is a "clear indication" 
that evidence would be found must be established by probable cause. See Hodson, 866 
P.2d at 560 ("'Clear indication' requires that there be probable cause to believe that 
evidence will be found." (citation omitted)). "In dealing with probable cause,. . . as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Cl. 1302 
(1949)). Probable cause is "more than bare suspicion." Id. The "'determination[] of 
whether probable cause exists require[s] a common sense assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances confronting the arresting or searching officer.'" State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 
655, 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). In this case, the officers did not even 
have a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe Mr. Alverez was involved in drug 
activities, see Point I, let alone probable cause to believe that he was swallowing drugs in 
his mouth. 
Once the officers detained Mr. Alverez, Wahlin first asked "him if he knew the 
vehicle that he was driving was uninsured." R. 88:6, 15. Mr. Alverez responded, 
"How'd you know that?" R. 88:9. Wahlin then stated to Mr. Alverez that the "vehicle 
that he was driving had been suspected of being a vehicle involved in some drag 
activities." R. 88:6, 16. Mr. Alverez responded that "he knew nothing of that." R. 88:6. 
Wahlin next proceeded to ask Mr. Alverez "if he had any drugs on his person." R. 88:6, 
16. Mr. Alverez said "No." R. 88:6, 17. Wahlin "then asked [Mr. Alverez] if he minded 
opening up his mouth to show [Wahlin] he didn't have any drugs in his mouth." R. 88:6, 
17. Wahlin did not notice any unsightly or unusual bulges in Mr. Alverez's mouth nor 
did he notice anything he would consider unusual except that Mr. Alverez became 
nervous when asked this question. R. 88:16, 18. In fact, Wahlin thought Mr. Alverez 
"talked quite well." R. 88:16-17, 19. 
Instead of being based on any reasonable articulate suspicion, Wahlin testified this 
is a standard question he asks of people he perceives to be drag dealers. R. 88:18. 
Wahlin then observed what he described as Mr. Alverez "attempting to move some 
objects . . . in his mouth" and "some swallowing motion." R. 88:7, 30. Although Mr. 
Alverez's "mouth was closed," Wahlin believed he "could see things . . . in the pit of Mr. 
Alverez's lip area" that looked "like his tongue and moving other objects in attempting to 
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swallow at that time." R. 88:7, 19. Steed, however, only noticed that Mr. Alverez "just 
appeared that he was attempting to swallow" after Wahlin asked if he could search Mr. 
Alverez's mouth for drugs. R. 88:30. Wahlin and Steed immediately grabbed one of Mr. 
Alverez's arms and put him in a wrist lock, bending him forward telling him "to spit out 
what he had in his mouth." R. 88:7-8, 30-31. The time that passed between Wahlin 
asking to search Mr. Alverez's mouth for drugs until Mr. Alverez was forcibly grabbed 
was between five to ten seconds. R. 88:8, 17. 
Under the totality of the circumstances the officers did not have a "clear 
indication" that drugs would be found in Mr. Alverez's mouth. At the time of the 
requested search, the officers did not know if they would in fact find anything in Mr. 
Alverez's mouth. The officers did not observe Mr. Alverez put any thing in his mouth, 
nor did they observe any conduct by Mr. Alverez that would suggest that his attempt to 
swallow was indicative of swallowing drugs. Compare Hodson I, 866 P.2d at 560 
("Defendant's furtive gestures of putting something in his mouth . . ., coupled with the 
agents' specific knowledge that [an informant] intended to purchase illegal drugs from 
defendant provided a clear indication that evidence would be found in defendant's 
mouth."). 
Again, Wahlin asked to search Mr. Alverez's mouth not because he saw something 
in there or had a hard time understanding Mr. Alverez but because that is a standard 
question he asks of those he perceives to be drug dealers. R. 88:18. "[B]ased upon 
Wahlin's experience, drug dealers usually package drugs like cocaine and heroin in small 
balloons, which they carry in their mouths." Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at [^18. When 
the officers acted with force in an effort to have Mr. Alverez "spit out" whatever was in 
his mouth, the officers were acting on no more than a "bare suspicion" or hunch that Mr. 
Alverez had drugs in his mouth. The only information the officers possessed at this time 
was based on an uncorroborated report that Mr. Alverez was driving a vehicle that was 
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suspected of "possibly" drug dealing in an area more than 20 blocks away. In the vehicle 
there was a small bottle of water and a facsimile of Jesus Malverde. The vehicle may or 
may not be Mr. Alverez's. Finally, Mr. Alverez made two short stay visits to a complex 
in which he may or may not be living. This information, even when coupled with the 
ambiguous "swallowing" conduct, did not amount to probable cause justifying a forcible 
search. Therefore, there can be no justification for the search under exigent 
circumstances. 
Despite the failure of the totality of the circumstances to establish reasonable 
suspicion, the majority opinion used the totality of these same factors to go a step further 
and conclude that they, along with Alverez's ambiguous actions of moving unknown 
objects in his mouth and making swallowing motions, gave the officers probable cause to 
conduct a bodily search. According to the majority opinion, these two factors elevated 
their finding from reasonable suspicion to the much greater "clear indication" level 
allowing the officers to conduct a bodily search. Id. at H19. But these additional factors 
did not give the officers a clear indication that drugs would be found in Mr. Alverez's 
mouth. 
The majority opinion not only allows officers to use unsubstantiated information to 
support reasonable suspicion but also allows officers to couple that information with bare 
hunches under the guise of "their experience and training" to establish probable cause 
allowing them to perform a forcible bodily search of any individual perceived as a drug 
dealer. Such a broad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is not in line with current 
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and unconstitutionally expands a police officers' ability 
to conduct bodily intrusion searches. 
Because the state did not meet its burden to show that there was a clear indication 
that evidence of drugs would be found in Mr. Alverez's mouth, this Court need not 
address the other two prerequisites outlined in Schmerber. See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 
1249, 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, even if this Court were to determine that 
probable cause existed, the exigent circumstances argument still fails because the state 
did not bear its burden of showing that the evidence would likely have been destroyed had 
the officers not seized it immediately. Discussion of the other two inter-related prongs 
further demonstrates how the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of 
Mr. Alverez's motion to suppress. 
B. The Officer's Forcible Bodily Search of Mr. Alverez Was Not Justified by 
Exigent Circumstances. 
Under the exigent circumstances prong of the Schmerber test, this Court has stated 
that "the police must. . . believe that . . . either contraband or evidence of a crime . . . may 
be lost if not immediately seized." State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990)). The 
Schmerber requirement of exigent circumstances is a serious one, which is based on the 
constitutional right to bodily integrity. 
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, 
absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the 
human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a 
requirement that the inferences to support the search "be drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." The importance of 
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informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or 
not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable 
and great. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (citations omitted). 
In order to "establish exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search" the 
state must show '"either that the procurement of a warrant would have jeopardized the 
safety of the police officers or the public, or that the evidence was likely to have been lost 
or destroyed." Hodson I, 866 P.2d at 561 (quoting Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1252). 
In finding that exigent circumstances existed in this case justifying the officers' 
warrantless bodily search of Mr. Alverez, the majority's reasoning conflicts with its 
finding of clear indication. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at fflf 18, 23, 26. To support its 
finding of clear indication, the majority stated: 
Wahlin asked Defendant to open his mouth to demonstrate that he did not 
have any drugs in his mouth because, based upon Wahlin's experience, drug 
dealers usually package drugs like cocaine and heroin in small balloons, 
which they carry in their mouths. Wahlin indicated that, based upon his 
experience, drug dealers do this so that they are able to swallow the 
balloons "before law enforcement can get to them." After asking 
Defendant to open his mouth, Wahlin noticed that Defendant became 
nervous and was using his tongue to move objects around in his mouth. In 
addition, both Wahlin and Steed believed, based upon their experience and 
training, that Defendant was trying to conceal evidence by swallowing it. 
More specifically, Steed believed, again based upon his experience and 
training, that Defendant "had balloons in his mouth" and that Defendant 
"was going to swallow drugs." 
Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at U 18. 
Indeed, the only evidence presented by the state at the motion to suppress hearing 
regarding drug packaging was testimony from the officers of their training and experience 
on how packaging is done when drugs are carried in the mouth. R. 88:2-3, 21. The state 
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presented the following testimony from the officers: 
State: Are you familiar with how drug - how drugs such as cocaine and heroin are 
usually packaged? 
Wahlin: Yes, I am. 
State: And how is that? 
Wahlin: Many times they're packaged in a - they'll take like a plastic, piece 
of plastic, put the drugs inside that, twist that into a small - small 
ball, you know, probably the size of the end of my fingertip, and then 
they encompass that with a balloon and tie that off. 
State: And where are they usually carried that you've seen? 
Wahlin: Typically when they package them in this fashion they'll carry them 
in their mouth. 
State: Have you done drug arrests before? 
Steed: Yes. 
State: How many would you say? 
Steed: I'd say I've personally been involved in more than 20 arrests at least. 




In fact, the significance of the bottle of water in the vehicle to Steed was that "[i]n 
the past when [he] had been involved in an initiation of, say traffic stops that contain 
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person that [he] believed to have narcotics [he has] seen them use that water to swallow 
drugs that they contain in their mouths." R. 88:29. The state did not present any evidence 
that drugs are carried using a different method. In fact, the state's evidence demonstrates 
that the officers believed that if Mr. Alverez was carrying drugs in his mouth the drugs 
would be packaged in this manner. 
Then, in order to support its finding of exigent circumstances, the majority 
reasoned that "[although Wahlin testified that, based upon his experience, drug dealers 
typically package drugs in small balloons for transport in their mouths, he and Steed did 
not know conclusively what was in Defendant's mouth or how any objects in Defendant's 
mouth were packaged." Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at 1J23. The majority then determined 
that its exigent circumstances analysis in Hodson I was valid despite this Court's 
reasoning in Hodson II which addressed the same theory argued by the state in this case 
regarding "the need to preserve evidence and protect defendant from harm." Id. at ]|24; 
Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158. The court of appeals concluded that because this Court's 
decision in Hodson II only explicitly overruled the reasonableness of the search procedure 
in Hodson I, it did not affect its reasoning regarding exigent circumstances. Alverez, 
2005 UT App 145 at 1124. While it is true that this Court only explicitly overruled the 
reasonableness of the search procedure, the Court's review of the state's "justification for 
the force used" invalidated the court of appeals' reasoning behind its exigent 
circumstances finding. Furthermore, the circumstances used to justify the search in 
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Hodson I were vastly different from those that existed in this case. 
In Hodson L the court of appeals upheld the trial court's conclusion that there was 
probable cause to believe that evidence of drugs would be found in the defendant's 
mouth. 866 P.2d at 560. The totality of the circumstances in Hodson consisted of the 
following: (1) a police informant "had agreed to arrange to purchase heroin from [the] 
defendant; (2) [the police informant] gave a prearranged signal indicating the drug 
transaction was complete;" and (3) one of the officers observed the defendant throw 
"something into his mouth when the officers approached with their lights flashing." Id. 
Hence, in Hodson I, the officer had prior knowledge that an informant had agreed to 
purchase drugs from the defendant, received a "prearranged signal" that the defendant 
had in fact sold drugs to the informant and one of the officers actually saw the defendant 
throw "something into his mouth" when the defendant realized that the officers were 
present. 
The defendant in Hodson I argued that exigent circumstances did not exist because 
"the police had no knowledge concerning how the heroin was wrapped or whether it 
would travel safely through his system." Id at 561. The court of appeals determined that 
it is precisely this reason in which exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search and 
seizure. Id. 
"When illegal drugs are ingested to conceal them from law enforcement, a 
reasonable police officer cannot know, for certain, the method of packaging 
the drug. As a result, it is not unreasonable to assume the drug might to be 
securely packaged so as to avoid its dissipation in the ingester's system, 
with resulting probable toxic effects. Therefore, contrary to defendant's 
assertion, it is precisely because the police did not know how the heroin was 
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packaged that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search and 
seizure. The exigencies in this case include both possible destruction of 
evidence and potential harm to defendant." 
Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at f 25 (quoting Hodson I, 866 P.2d at 561). 
Unlike the officers in Hodson I, the officers in this case did not see Alverez put 
anything into his mouth and did not notice any unsightly or unusual bulges. Id. at ]|23; R. 
88:16-17. Nor did the officers have any prior information that Alverez himself was 
involved in any drug activity. Nevertheless, the majority found that under their Hodson I 
analysis, because the officers "did not know conclusively what was in defendant's mouth" 
and "did not know how the drugs were packaged, exigent circumstances existed in this 
case." Id at 1ffl 23, 26. 
However, in Hodson II, this Court disagreed with the state's argument that the 
force used in that case was justified because of the need to preserve evidence and protect 
the defendant from harm. Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158. In reversing Hodson I's decision 
on the reasonableness of the search involved this Court stated: 
[W]e do not know, and cannot ascertain from the record, any of the 
necessary fact which might have supported a reasonable fear by the officers 
that swallowing the plastic-wrapped chips would render their contents 
nondiscoverable or harmful to defendant. There is considerable indication 
in the cases cited by both parties that drug dealers commonly seek to secrete 
drugs by means of swallowing, and it does not seem likely that they would 
routinely risk their own safety or lives. Furthermore, drugs ingested in this 
manner can only follow two paths: Either they will pass through the system 
intact because of their packaging, or they will be absorbed into the 
bloodstream of the swallower. In either event, they are susceptible to 
identification and recovery in supervised, nonviolent post-arrest settings. 
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Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158. 
This Court's reasoning regarding the likelihood of evidence of a crime 
being destroyed if swallowed is also supported by the California Supreme Court in 
People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624, 631 (Cal. 1975). In Bracamonte, narcotics 
agents had secured a warrant to search defendant's residence, vehicles and person. 
540 P.2d at 626. While attempting to execute the warrant, the defendant 
attempted to flee in her vehicle. Id, An agent then observed the defendant place 
two balloons in her mouth and swallow them. Id The agent watched as the 
defendant made "two more quick hand movements, each time apparently placing 
more objects into her mouth." Id After apprehending the defendant, the agents, 
twenty minutes later, took her to a local hospital to retrieve the objects the 
defendant had swallowed. Id, After attempting to insert a rubber tube down the 
defendant's nose and esophagus, the defendant agreed to drink the emetic solution 
allowing the officers to retrieve seven balloons of heroin. Id. at 626-27. 
The court determined that although "there clearly was probable cause to believe 
that the defendant had swallowed packages containing heroin, there was no [exigency] 
justifying the intrusion into her body." Id. at 628. So although there was a "'clear 
indication' that the defendant probably swallowed balloons of heroin,. . . there was no 
substantial reason to believe that evidence would be destroyed." Id, at 630-31; Hodson II, 
907 P.2d at 1158. The testimony presented demonstrated that u[t]he rubber container 
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would effectively prevent the contents from being absorbed into the system." l± at 631 
(quotations and citations omitted). Because there is a "high statistical probability that the 
balloons would 'pass through,'" the defendant "easily could have been transported to jail 
and placed in an isolation cell and kept under proper surveillance." Id. 
The court of appeals did not find this Court's reasoning in Hodson II applicable 
because it viewed it as limited to the reasonableness of the force used in Hodson I. 
Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at ]j 24. The majority also rejected the reasoning and holding 
of the Bracamonte court because 
Unlike the officers in Bracamonte, Wahlin and Steed did not observe 
Defendant place any objects in his mouth or have any knowledge of how 
any objects in his mouth were packaged. Although Wahlin testified that, 
based upon his experience, drug dealers typically package drugs in small 
balloons for transport in their mouths, he and Steed did not know 
conclusively what was in Defendant's mouth or how any objects in 
Defendant's mouth were packaged. 
Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at If 23. 
The majority then applied its exigent circumstances reasoning from Hodson I, 
concluding exigent circumstances existed because the officers had "'probable cause and 
believed that either contraband or evidence of a crime . . . may [have been] lost if not 
immediately seized.'" Id As pointed out, the court of appeal's reasoning of clear 
indication and exigent circumstances is internally inconsistent. First, the court of appeals 
justifies a finding of clear indication based on the officers' testimony regarding their 
training and experience that drug dealers carry balloon wrapped drugs in their mouths to 
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enable them to conceal the drugs by swallowing them. Id. at [^18. Then, the court of 
appeals concludes that exigent circumstances exist because officers cannot know, for 
certain, how drugs carried in the mouth are packaged. Id. at HH 25-26. 
This Court's reasoning regarding the state's claim of "the need to preserve 
evidence and protect the defendant from harm" applies in the determination of whether 
exigent circumstances existed. In this case, the state presented evidence regarding the 
officers' belief on how the drugs would be packaged. The officers' testimony can only 
support a conclusion that they believed that if Mr. Alverez was carrying drugs in his 
mouth, they would be packaged in accordance with their prior knowledge and experience. 
The fact that the officers did not have any specific knowledge that Mr. Alverez was 
engaged in drug sales and never saw Mr. Alverez put anything in his mouth in an effort to 
conceal evidence of a crime further belies the court of appeals' conclusion that despite the 
officers' belief regarding the packaging of drugs carried by dealers in their mouths, their 
was still "probable cause [to believe that any] . . . evidence of a crime [would be] lost if 
not immediately seized." Id In fact, it weakens the exigent circumstances argument 
rather than strengthens it. 
In addition, the state presented "no justifiable reason to conduct [a] warrant less 
search since [the] evidence could be retrieved through 'the ordinary processes of nature.'" 
Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253 (citing Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 631); see also Hodson II, 907 
P.2d at 1158; compare Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (exigent circumstances exist where 
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percentage of alcohol in blood rapidly dissipates after drinking stops). The state failed to 
present any evidence regarding the officers' belief that if in fact the defendant had 
swallowed drugs they would be lost or destroyed. In fact, the state failed to introduce any 
evidence about the likelihood that the drugs would have been damaged by going through 
the human digestive tract or that Mr. Alverez's health would have been jeopardized. 
Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158 (regardless of how drugs swallowed are packaged "they are 
susceptible to identification and recovery in supervised, nonviolent post-arrest setting"). 
Under the court of appeals' holding, exigent circumstances allowing a forcible 
search exist whenever officers have a hunch that a defendant is a drug dealer attempting 
to swallow drugs even if they do not "know conclusively what [is] in [a defendant's 
mouth," have not observed a defendant place any objects in his mouth, and do not know 
conclusively "how any objects in [a defendant's] mouth [are] packaged." Alverez, 2005 
UT App 145 at 1123. The court of appeals' holding is contrary to established Fourth 
Amendment law and directly contravenes this Court's reasoning in Hodson II. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE FORCE USED BY 
THE OFFICERS TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE WAS NOT REASONABLE 
IN THIS CASE. 
Under the third prong of the Schmerber test, the state must show that the method 
chosen was reasonable and the search was done in a reasonable manner. Schmerber, 384 
U.S. at 771-72. In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985), the 
Supreme Court reiterated the need for probable cause showing that evidence will be 
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found and that exigent circumstances are sufficient to dispense with the warrant 
requirement. Id. at 761. In reviewing Schmerber and the reasonableness prong, the 
Supreme Court articulated a three-part test. The first factor is "the extent to which the 
procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual." Winston, 470 U.S. at 761; 
Hodson, 907 P.2d at 1157. While the Court found that a physician's blood draw was 
permissible because "c[f]or most people, [a blood test] involves virtually no risk, trauma, 
or pain'" Winston, 470 U.S. at 761 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771), the Winston 
Court found that the risks involved in the surgical removal of a bullet from the defendant 
were too great to be reasonable. Id. at 764. 
In this case, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that evidence 
would be found nor exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless bodily search, and yet 
they chose an unreasonable method of investigation that involved both pain and risks to 
Mr. Alverez's health. The officers in this case each grabbed Mr. Alverez by one of his 
arms and put him in a very painful wrist lock forcing him to bend forward while ordering 
him to spit out the contents of his mouth. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at ^28; R. 88:7-8, 
30-31. This method was not only painful but particularly dangerous in light of the 
officers' belief that Mr. Alverez was attempting to swallow balloons of drugs in his 
mouth. Grabbing Mr. Alverez in such a manner created a substantial risk of him 
aspirating on objects in his mouth. Given the state's evidence of the officers' experience 
with how drugs carried in the mouth are packaged, and the "high statistical probability 
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that balloons would 'pass through"5 the defendant, the officers "easily could have been 
transported to jail and placed in an isolation cell and kept under proper surveillance." 
Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 631; Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1157. 
The second factor in the reasonableness analysis is "the extent of intrusion upon 
the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity." Winston, 
470 U.S. at 761-62; Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1157. The Court noted that searches of 
people's homes and phone conversations, and forcing people to come to the police station 
were neither painful nor physically dangerous, but did impinge on Fourth Amendment 
interests and, the "individual's sense of personal privacy and security." Winston, 470 
U.S. at 762. As stated above, the officers grabbed Mr. Alverez's arms and put him in a 
wrist lock, bending him forward in an attempt to prevent him from swallowing. Having 
his body subjected to such physical pain and the concomitant risk cause by such a 
procedure in a public place epitomizes conduct that intrudes on one's rights to privacy, 
bodily integrity and dignitary interests. Therefore, the officers' conduct was 
constitutionally unreasonable. 
The final factor in the reasonableness analysis is "the need to preserve evidence of 
criminal behavior." Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158. Similar to the argument made by the 
state in Hodson II, the state argues here that "[t]he justification for the force used in this 
case is the need to preserve evidence and protect defendant from harm." Id, As discussed 
above, this Court rejected the state's argument stating: 
There is considerable indication . . . that drug dealers commonly seek to 
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secrete drugs by means of swallowing, and it does not seem likely that they 
would routinely risk their own safety or lives. [People v. Jones, 257 Cal. 
Rptr. 500, 503 (1989); State v. Tapp, 353 So.2d 265, 269 (La. 1977)].... 
No emergency or exigency justifies the use of force . . . to preserve 
evidence which would be readily (if inconveniently) accessible through 
nonviolent means. 
14 
The majority opinion found this Court's analysis on the third prong in Hodson II 
limited to only "to the type of extreme force used by officers in that case." Alverez, 2005 
UT App 145 at TJ31. However, this Court's determination in Hodson II applies equally in 
this case because the state presented no evidence that "might have supported a reasonable 
fear by the officers that swallowing the [balloon wrapped drugs] would render their 
contents nondiscoverable or harmful to defendant." Id. In fact, under the totality of 
circumstances of this case, the state demonstrated no compelling need for this search, 
because they had little more than a hunch that evidence of a crime would be found at the 
time of the search, and there were available constitutional methods of conducting the 
search that were ignored. Because the state did not meet its burden to justify the 
warrantless and unreasonable search of Mr. Alverez, all evidence seized as a result should 
have been suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
39 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Mr. Alverez, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the court of 
appeals' opinion affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and reverse 
his conviction. 
SUBMITTED this ^ day of November, 2005. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
STEVEN G. SHAPIRO 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
fl Ernesto Alverez (Defendant) appeals his conviction of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (2002) . We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND1 
%2 On June 23, 2003, two Salt Lake City Police officers, one of 
whom was Officer Don Wahlin, were observing a condominium complex 
in Salt Lake City because, according to Wahlin, they had received 
information that drug transactions had been taking place in that 
area. While observing the condominium complex that day, Wahlin 
saw a vehicle (the vehicle) drive into the complex. Wahlin had 
1. With the exception of the facts recited concerning the 
procedural history of Defendant's case, the following facts were 
presented at the August 29, 2003 hearing on Defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
previously received information from the narcotics division of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department that the vehicle had 
possibly been involved in drug transactions. Wahlin then saw 
Defendant get out of the vehicle, enter the condominium complex, 
return to the vehicle less than five minutes later, get back into 
the vehicle, and drive the vehicle out of the complex. Based 
upon the information he had previously received and his 
observation of Defendant that day, Wahlin believed that Defendant 
had been involved in a drug transaction. Wahlin testified that 
he believed Defendant's short visit to the complex was consistent 
with short-stay drug traffic. Although Wahlin discovered that 
day that the vehicle was uninsured, he and the other officer 
chose not to initiate a traffic stop on that basis. 
%3 Wahlin testified that because it was typical for drug 
dealers to frequent the same location, he and Salt Lake City 
Police Sergeant Chad Steed decided to return to the condominium 
complex the following day to see if the vehicle would return. 
While observing the complex, Wahlin and Steed saw Defendcint drive 
the vehicle into the same area of the complex as he had the 
previous day, get out of the vehicle, and enter the complex. 
Wahlin and Steed then walked to the vehicle and waited for 
Defendant to return. Wahlin and Steed waited in an empty parking 
stall adjacent to the vehicle, behind a full-size van that was 
parked in the stall adjacent to the empty stall. 
U4 While waiting, Steed looked inside the vehicle and observed 
a facsimile of "Jesus Malverde," which Steed testified he was 
able to recognize through his training, interviews he had 
conducted, and his observation of known drug houses. Steed also 
testified that, according to interviews he had conducted, "Jesus 
Malverde" was the patron saint of drug dealing. In addition, 
Steed observed a small bottle of water in the console of the 
vehicle, which he testified he had seen suspected drug dealers 
use during traffic stops to swallow drugs concealed in their 
mouths. 
1J5 Less than five minutes after entering the condominium 
complex, Defendant exited the complex and approached the vehicle. 
As Defendant came around the full-size van, Wahlin and Steed, who 
were both in uniform, approached Defendant "to talk with him." 
Wahlin first asked if Defendant knew that the vehicle was 
uninsured. According to Wahlin, Defendant's response was, 
"How[ did] you know that?" Wahlin then explained to Defendant 
that the vehicle had been suspected of being involved in some 
drug transactions. According to Wahlin, Defendant denied having 
any knowledge of this information. Wahlin continued by asking 
Defendant if he had any drugs on his person, and Defendant 
responded that he did not. Wahlin also asked Defendant if he 
would open his mouth to demonstrate that he did not have any 
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drugs in his mouth. Wahlin testified that he asked this question 
because, in his experience, drug dealers usually package drugs 
like cocaine and heroin in small balloons, which they carry in 
their mouths. Wahlin also testified that drug dealers do this so 
that they are able to swallow the balloons "before law 
enforcement can get to them." Prior to asking this question, 
Wahlin did not notice anything unusual about Defendant's mouth or 
any impediments to Defendant's speech. However, after asking 
this question, Wahlin noticed that Defendant became nervous and 
was using his tongue to move objects around in his mouth. In 
addition, both Wahlin and Steed observed Defendant making 
swallowing motions. Both Wahlin and Steed testified that, at 
this point, they believed that Defendant was trying to conceal 
evidence by swallowing it. Steed further testified that he 
believed that Defendant "had balloons in his mouth" and that 
Defendant "was going to swallow drugs." Immediately, both Wahlin 
and Steed grabbed Defendant's aims, placed him in a "wrist lock," 
and bent him forward. Wahlin testified that they bent Defendant 
forward because, based on Wahlin's experience, that made it 
harder for Defendant to swallow anything that might have been in 
his mouth. Wahlin then told Defendant to spit out what he had in 
his mouth. Defendant spit out fifteen balloons containing 
illegal narcotics. Wahlin testified that the amount of time that 
passed between him asking Defendant to open his mouth and 
Defendant spitting out the balloons was approximately five to ten 
seconds. 
f6 On June 26, 2003, Defendant was charged with two counts of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (2002) . On 
August 13, 2003, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained by Wahlin and Steed during their encounter with 
Defendant, arguing that their warrantless search was 
constitutionally impermissible. At the conclusion of the August 
29, 2003 evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, 
the trial court denied Defendant's motion. 
1[7 On October 17, 2003, Defendant filed a petition for 
interlocutory review of the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. This court denied Defendant's motion in an order dated 
November 26, 2003. On January 5, 2004, pursuant to State v. 
Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Defendant pleaded guilty 
to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to distribute, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1) (a) (iii), but preserved his right to appeal the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant appeals. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
K8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress. 
We review the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence using a clearly 
erroneous standard. However, we review the 
trial court's conclusions of law based on 
these findings for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial 
judge's application of the legal standard to 
the facts. 
State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62,^8, 6 P. 3d 1133 (quotations and 
citations omitted). "The measure of discretion afforded varies, 
however, according to the issue being reviewed." State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1(26, 63 P. 3d 650. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that "[w]hen a case involves the reasonableness of a 
search and seizure, "we afford little discretion to the district 
court because there must be state-wide standards that guide law 
enforcement and prosecutorial officials.1" State v. Warren, 2003 
UT 36,1(12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at H26) . 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court "abandon[ed] the standard 
which extended 'some deference' to the application of law to the 
underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases in favor 
of non[] deferential review." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,1(15, 103 
P. 3d 699. Because this case involves a search and seizure, we do 
not extend any deference to the trial court in its application of 
the law to its factual findings. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
iJ9 Defendant first argues that Wahlin and Steed 
unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of their initial encounter 
with Defendant when Wahlin, without reasonable suspicion to do 
so, questioned Defendant about drugs. Defendant also argues that 
even if Wahlin did have reasonable suspicion to ask Defendant 
about drugs, the State failed to demonstrate the lawfulness of 
Wahlin and Steed's subsequent warrantless search of Defendant. 
We will address each argument in turn. 
I. Questioning About Drugs 
KlO Defendant asserts that when Wahlin began questioning 
Defendant about the uninsured status of the vehicle, he engaged 
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Defendant in a valid, level two encounter,2 which was limited to 
the potential insurance violation. See generally Salt Lake City 
v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,111, 998 P.2d 274 (explaining a level two 
encounter). Defendant then argues that Wahlin and Steed 
unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of this initial detention 
when Wahlin, without reasonable suspicion to do so, detained 
Defendant further to question him about drugs. We disagree with 
Defendant's argument and with his characterization of his 
detention as being initially limited to the potential insurance 
violation. 
Ull "[A]n officer may stop and question a person when the 
officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has 
been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State 
v. Penaf 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994) (quotations and citation 
omitted). In determining whether an officer has reasonable, 
articulable suspicion, we consider "the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the officer had specific and 
articulable facts- which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, warrant a detention." State v. Munsenf 821 
P.2d 13, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Kl2 In an apparent attempt to limit the scope of his encounter 
with Wahlin and Steed, Defendant has mischaracterized the 
encounter as being limited to the uninsured status of the 
vehicle. Although it is true that the first question Wahlin 
asked Defendant concerned the potential insurance violation, we 
are not persuaded that this operated to limit the encounter to 
that issue alone. In essence, Defendant has selectively divided 
Wahlin and Steed's fluid encounter with Defendant into two parts, 
arguing that the first part was a valid level two encounter and 
that the second part unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of the 
2. The parties disagree about the level of Defendant's encounter 
with Wahlin and Steed. Defendant argues that his detention was a 
level two encounter, which constitutes a seizure for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment. See generally Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 
UT App 55,11(10-11, 998 P. 2d 274 (explaining the "three levels of 
constitutionally permissible encounters between law enforcement 
officers and the public"). The State, on the other hand, argues 
that Defendant's detention was a level one encounter, which does 
not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
See id. Because the outcome of Defendant's appeal would be the 
same regardless of our conclusion on this issue, we adopt 
Defendant's position for purposes of our analysis. However, in 
doing so, we do not express an opinion about whether Defendant's 
encounter with Wahlin and Steed actually was a level two 
encounter constituting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
^nndnoqq-rA 5 
first. However, after reviewing the record, it is far from clear 
to us, despite Defendant's assumptions to the contrary, that 
Wahlin and Steed's sole purpose for approaching Defendant was to 
resolve the potential insurance violation. 
Hl3 Rather, our review of the record reveals that Wahlin and 
Steed had knowledge of the following "specific and articulable 
facts" and made the following "rational inferences from those 
facts," id. (quotations and citations omitted), which warranted 
engaging Defendant in a level two encounter to ask him about the 
potential insurance violation and about drugs. On June 23, 2003, 
Wahlin saw the vehicle enter the aforementioned condominium 
complex. The complex was located in an area where, according to 
information Wahlin had previously received, drug transactions had 
been taking place. In addition, Wahlin had previously received 
information from the narcotics division of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department that the vehicle had possibly been involved in 
drug transactions. On that day, Wahlin saw Defendant get out of 
the vehicle, enter the complex, return to the vehicle less than 
five minutes later, get back into the vehicle, and drive the 
vehicle out of the complex. Based upon the information he had 
previously received, his observation of Defendant that day, and 
his belief that Defendant's short visit to the complex wais 
consistent with short-stay drug traffic, Wahlin believed that 
Defendant had been involved in a drug transaction. Based upon 
information he gathered that day, Wahlin discovered that the 
vehicle was uninsured. The following day, based upon Wahlin1s 
experience that it was typical for drug dealers to frequent the 
same location, he and Steed returned to the complex and saw 
Defendant drive the vehicle into the same area of the complex as 
he had the previous day, get out of the vehicle, and enter the 
complex. After approaching the vehicle, Steed looked inside and 
observed a facsimile of "Jesus Malverde," which Steed recognized 
to be the patron saint of drug dealing. In addition, Steed 
observed a small bottle of water in the console of the vehicle, 
which he had seen suspected drug dealers use during traffic stops 
to swallow drugs concealed in their mouths.3 
3. Defendant attempts to attack the veracity and significance of 
several of these facts individually. Defendant also correctly 
notes that the trial court accorded "little weight" to the 
facsimile of "Jesus Malverde" and the small bottle of water. 
However, our review of the record reveals that reasonable 
suspicion existed based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
not based upon an analysis of each individual fact. Further, 
Defendant's attack upon the individual facts is a tactic that has 
been criticized by the United States Supreme Court. See United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (stating that the 
(continued...) 
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i[l4 Given the foregoing, it is clear that, under "the totality 
of the circumstances," Wahlin and Steed had "specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, warrant[ed] [the] detention" of Defendant to 
question him about the uninsured status of the vehicle and about 
drugs. Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, we 
conclude that Wahlin had reasonable, articulable suspicion to ask 
Defendant about drugs. 
II. Validity of Warrantless Search 
iJl5 Defendant also argues that even if Wahlin did have 
reasonable suspicion to ask Defendant about drugs, the State 
failed to demonstrate the lawfulness of Wahlin and Steed's 
subsequent warrantless search of Defendant. We disagree. 
Ul6 In order to demonstrate the lawfulness of a warrantless, 
bodily search, the State must establish three elements: (A) "a 
clear indication that evidence would be found"; (B) "exigent 
circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily intrusion"; 
and (C) "that the method chosen was a reasonable one, performed 
in a reasonable manner." State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 560 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Hodson I) (citing Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 768-72 (1966)), rev'd on other grounds. 907 P.2d 
1155 (Utah 1995) (Hodson II) (reversing based only upon the 
Hodson I court's conclusion on the third element--i.e., the 
reasonableness of the search procedure). 
A. Clear Indication that Evidence Would be Found 
i[l7 To establish the first element, the State must prove that at 
the time of their warrantless search of Defendant, Wahlin and 
Steed had "a clear indication that evidence would be found." 
Hodson I. 866 P.2d at 560. "'Clear indication' requires that 
there be probable cause to believe that evidence will be found." 
Id. (citations omitted). "In general, probable cause means a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quotations and citation omitted). "The probable cause 
determination is based on the totality of the circumstances." 
Id. (quotations and citation omitted). "The validity of the 
probable cause determination is made from the objective 
standpoint of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer 
3. (...continued) 
"evaluation and rejection" of facts "in isolation from each other 
does not take into account the 'totality of the circumstances,'" 
and noting that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), "precludes this 
sort of divide-and-conquer analysis"). 
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. . . guided by his experience and training. In making that 
determination, a police officer is entitled to rely on 
information gained from other police officers." Hodson I, 866 
P.2d at 560 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
tl8 Because "[t]he probable cause determination is based on the 
totality of the circumstances," Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 
(quotations and citation omitted) , we must consider the facts 
that served as the basis for Wahlin and Steed possessing 
reasonable suspicion to ask Defendant about drugs, as well as the 
following facts concerning Wahlin1 s questioning of Defendant 
about drugs. Wahlin asked Defendant to open his mouth to 
demonstrate that he did not have any drugs in his mouth because, 
based upon Wahlin1s experience, drug dealers usually package 
drugs like cocaine and heroin in small balloons, which they carry 
in their mouths. Wahlin indicated that, based upon his 
experience, drug dealers do this so that they are able to swallow 
the balloons "before law enforcement can get to them." After 
asking Defendant to open his mouth, Wahlin noticed that Defendant 
became nervous4 and was using his tongue to move objects around 
in his mouth. In addition, both Wahlin and Steed observed 
Defendant making swallowing motions. Given these observations, 
Wahlin and Steed believed, based upon their experience and 
training, that Defendant was trying to conceal evidence by 
swallowing it. More specifically, Steed believed, a:gain based 
upon his experience and training, that Defendant "had balloons in 
his mouth" and that Defendant "was going to swallow drugs." 
^19 In determining whether probable cause existed, we must 
consider all of the aforementioned facts from "the objective 
standpoint of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer 
. . . guided by his experience and training." Hodson I, 866 P.2d 
at 560 (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted). After reviewing the record facts in this light, we 
have determined that Wahlin and Steed were justified in believing 
that there was "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime [would] be found." Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 (quotations 
and citation omitted). Therefore, we conclude that Wahlin and 
Steed had "probable cause to believe"--i.e., "a clear 
indication"--"that evidence would be found." Hodson If 866 P.2d 
at 560 (quotations and citations omitted). 
4. "Although [Defendant's nervous or suspicious behavior is 
insufficient by itself to establish probable cause, it may . . . 
be considered in conjunction with other relevant and objective 
facts." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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B. Exigent Circumstances 
1120 To establish the second element, the State must demonstrate 
"exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily 
intrusion." Id. Exigent circumstances exist when either (1) 
"the procurement of a warrant would have jeopardized the safety 
of the police officers or the public," or (2) "the evidence was 
likely to have been lost or destroyed." Id. at 561 (quotations 
and citations omitted). In order for the second circumstance to 
apply, "the police must have probable cause and believe that 
either contraband or evidence of a crime . . . may be lost if not 
immediately seized." State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
f21 In arguing that exigent circumstances did not exist in this 
case, Defendant relies primarily upon Palmer, People v. 
Bracamonte. 540 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1975), and Hodson II. However, 
Defendant's reliance upon these cases is misplaced. 
1J22 Defendant relies upon the Palmer court's conclusion that 
there w$.s "no justifiable reason to believe [evidence] would be 
destroyed" by the defendant in Palmer "if he had swallowed it." 
Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253 (citing Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 631). 
Although Defendant's assertion is generally correct, he neglects 
to specifically mention that the evidence swallowed by the 
defendant in Palmer was a diamond ring. .See id. at 1250-51. 
Based upon the difference between the evidence in Palmer and the 
evidence in this case, we conclude that the holding of Palmer is 
inapplicable to this case. As we will discuss below, we have 
determined that Wahlin and Steed had probable cause and believed 
that the evidence in this case, unlike the diamond ring in 
Palmer, may have been "lost if not immediately seized." Id. at 
1252 (quotations and citation omitted). 
i]23 Defendant also relies upon the reasoning and holding of 
Bracamonte. In Bracamonte, the officers observed the defendant 
place balloons in her mouth and swallow them. See 54 0 P.2d at 
626. In holding that the balloons should not have been received 
in evidence by the trial court, see id. at 631, the Bracamonte 
court noted that evidence such as that swallowed by the defendant 
"may pass completely through the digestive tract, by the ordinary 
processes of nature, without causing any ill effects. The rubber 
container would effectively prevent the contents from being 
absorbed into the system." Id. Unlike the officers in 
Bracamonte, Wahlin and Steed did not observe Defendant place any 
objects in his mouth or have any knowledge of how any objects in 
his mouth were packaged. Although Wahlin testified that, based 
upon his experience, drug dealers typically package drugs in 
small balloons for transport in their mouths, he and Steed did 
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not know conclusively what was in Defendant's mouth or how any 
objects in Defendant's mouth were packaged. For this reason, we 
decline to adopt the reasoning and holding of Bracamonte in this 
case. 
U24 Finally, Defendant relies upon Hodson II. Although it is 
true that the Hodson II court overruled this court's decision in 
Hodson I, it did so on only one issue and it did not upset this 
court's ruling on exigent circumstances. See State v. Hodson, 
866 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Hodson I), rev'd on other 
grounds, 907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995) (Hodson II) (reversing based 
only upon the Hodson I court's conclusion on the third element--
i.e., the reasonableness of the search procedure). Therefore, 
the Hodson II court's decision is not directly applicable to the 
exigent circumstances element, and this court's conclusion on 
exigent circumstances in Hodson I is still valid. Accordingly, 
we apply Hodson I in analyzing Defendant's argument. 
K25 In Hodson I, this court stated: 
When illegal drugs are ingested to conceal 
them from law enforcement, a reasonable 
police officer cannot know, for certain, the 
method of packaging the drug. As a result, 
it is not unreasonable to assume the drug 
might not be securely packaged so as to avoid 
its dissipation in the ingester's system, 
with resulting probable toxic effects. 
Therefore, contrary to defendant's assertion, 
it is precisely because the police did not 
know how the heroin was packaged that exigent 
circumstances justified a warrantless search 
and seizure. The exigencies in this case 
included both possible destruction of 
evidence and potential harm to defendant. 
866 P.2d at 561. 
1126 We agree with the reasoning and holding of the Hodson I 
court.5 In this case, although Wahlin and Steed may have 
5. Holdings from other jurisdictions are consistent with this 
court's holding on exigent circumstances in Hodson I. See, e.g., 
State v. Hoiton, 975 P.2d 789, 790, 792-93 (Idaho 1999) (holding 
that exigent circumstances existed when one officer asked the 
defendant to open his mouth, the defendant began chewing and 
attempting to swallow something that was in his mouth (later 
discovered to be a small plastic bag of methamphetamine), the 
(continued...) 
believed that the objects in Defendant's mouth were drugs that 
were securely packaged in balloons, they could not "know, for 
certain, the method of packaging the drug." Id. In accordance 
with Hodson I, because they did not know how the drugs were 
packaged, exigent circumstances existed in this case. See id. 
Put another way, because we conclude that Wahlin and Steed had 
"probable cause and believe[d] that either contraband or evidence 
of a crime . . . may [have been] lost if not immediately seized," 
Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1252 (second alteration in original) 
5 . (...continued) 
defendant refused to disgorge the object, and one officer saw 
something that looked like a piece of plastic in defendant's 
mouth while he was chewing, because "[t]he officers acted on a 
reasonable belief that [the defendant] was attempting to destroy 
the evidence" and there was a risk that the defendant could 
"asphyxiate on the plastic bag or suffer from a massive overdose 
of methamphetamine"); State v. Harris, 505 N.W.2d 724, 727, 732 
(Neb. 1993) (holding that exigent circumstances existed when the 
officer noticed that the defendant was chewing on something and 
the defendant refused to disgorge the object, because the officer 
"had no way of knowing whether the suspected narcotic in [the 
defendant's] mouth could be retrieved later or whether it would 
be destroyed when [the defendant] ingested it" and the 
defendant's "health and physical safety could have been 
endangered had the police officers allowed [the defendant] to 
swallow the suspected narcotic"); State v. Lomack, 545 N.W.2d 
455, 459, 463 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that exigent 
circumstances existed when one officer saw a small plastic bag in 
the defendant's mouth and the defendant refused to disgorge it, 
because "there [was] nothing to show that the officers could have 
determined, when making their split-second decision, how 
effectively the substance was packaged or whether [the defendant] 
could have bitten through the packaging" and "[b]ecause of the 
possibility that the evidence in [the defendant]'s mouth could 
have been destroyed or that [the defendant] could have injured 
himself by ingesting the cocaine"); State v. Taplin, 676 P.2d 
504, 505-06 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting the defendant's 
argument that was based upon People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624 
(Cal. 1975), and holding that exigent circumstances existed when 
the officer saw the defendant make swallowing motions, the 
officer saw balloons in the defendant's mouth, and the defendant 
initially refused to disgorge the balloons, because it was 
"possible that the evidence would not have passed through [the 
defendant's] digestive system," "[u]nder the circumstances the 
possibility that the evidence could have been destroyed justified 
the officers in 'seizing' the balloons," and " [i]t was as likely 
that the evidence would have been destroyed as that it would have 
been recovered"). 
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(quotations and citation omitted), "exigent circumstances . . . 
justified the warrantless bodily intrusion." Hodson I, 866 P.2d 
at 560. 
C. Reasonable Method Performed in a Reasonable Manner 
H27 To establish the third element, the State must demonstrate 
that the search procedure employed by Wahlin and Steed "was a 
reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner." Id. To 
determine whether a search procedure was reasonable, we must 
measure it against three factors: "(1) the extent to which the 
procedure used may threaten the safety or health of the 
individual, (2) the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's 
dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, and 
(3) the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining 
guilt or innocence." Hodson II. 907 P. 2d at 1157 (citing Winston 
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1985)). The first two factors 
represent Defendant's individual interests and are weighed 
against the third factor, which represents the State's interest. 
See Winston 470 U.S. at 762 (outlining the first two factors and 
stating that the third factor is "[w]eighed against these 
individual interests"); Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158 (determining 
that "the weight of the risk and the intrusion under the first 
two [factors] . . . was considerable, and the critical 
determination is whether the third factor . . . can shift: the 
balance"). 
1|28 First, we must determine the extent to which the procedure 
used by Wahlin and Steed "threaten[ed] the safety or health of" 
Defendant. Hodson II, 907 P. 2d at 1157. According to the 
record, Wahlin and Steed placed Defendant in a "wrist lock" that 
lasted approximately five to ten seconds. Even if Defendant is 
correct in his assertion that the "wrist lock" was "extremely 
painful," any pain inflicted was very brief in nature. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the procedure used by Wahlin and 
Steed created little or no threat to Defendant's safety or 
health. Cf. id. at 1158 (holding that risk to safety and health 
was "considerable" when the defendant was "threatened with a 
firearm, . . . dragged from his vehicle, thrown to the ground, 
and ordered to spit out what was in his mouth by an officer whose 
arm was around his neck"). 
U29 Second, we must determine the extent to which the procedure 
used by Wahlin and Steed intruded upon Defendant's "dignitary 
interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity." Id. at 
1157. According to the record, the only physical contact that 
Wahlin and Steed had with Defendant was the "wrist lock." Given 
its brief nature and limited physical contact, we conclude that 
the "wrist lock" presented an extremely low level of intrusion 
upon Defendant's interests in personal privacy and bodily 
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integrity. Cf. id. at 1158 (holding that intrusion was high 
where the defendant "was assaulted with a loaded weapon, dragged 
to the ground, had some degree of force applied to his throat, 
and had fingers inserted in his mouth without his consent or 
cooperation"). 
1f30 Finally, we must examine the State's "interest in fairly and 
accurately determining guilt or innocence." Id. at 1157. In 
other words, we must determine "the need to preserve evidence of 
criminal behavior." Id. at 1158. Defendant argues that the 
Hodson II court's holding is directly applicable to this factor. 
We disagree. 
1|31 The Hodson II court held that "[i]n the absence of an urgent 
need to preserve evidence, there cannot be a justification for 
the significant risks to health and safety posed by using the 
kind of force in this case to get a suspect to spit out what is 
believed to be a mouthful of drugs." Id. (emphasis added). The 
Hodson II court also stated that "[n]o emergency or exigency 
justifies the use of force at this level to preserve evidence 
which would be readily (if inconveniently) accessible through 
nonviolent means." Id. (emphasis added). In his argument, 
Defendant neglects to mention the emphasized portions of these 
statements from Hodson II, which, in our view, limit its holding 
to the type of extreme force used by the officers in that case. 
See id. Further, contrary to Defendant's argument, Hodson II 
does not operate to diminish the State's "need to preserve 
evidence of criminal behavior," id., in every case where officers 
suspect that a defendant is about to swallow or has swallowed 
drugs. Rather, it specifically holds that this State interest-
represented by the third factor--is outweighed by the 
individual's interests--represented by the first two factors--
when a defendant is about to swallow or has swallowed drugs and 
the officers employ the extreme levels of force described in 
Hodson II. See id. 
1|3 2 Considering the force used by Wahlin and Steed in this case, 
we conclude that the State's "interest in fairly and accurately 
determining guilt or innocence," id. at 1157, in this case 
clearly outweighs the extremely low threat to Defendant's safety 
or health and the negligible intrusion upon Defendant's interests 
in personal privacy and bodily integrity. See id. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the search procedure used by Wahlin and Steed 
was reasonable. 
H33 Because the State has demonstrated the three required 
elements, see State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (Hodson I), rev'd on other grounds, 907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 
1995) (Hodson II), we conclude that Wahlin and Steed's 
warrantless search of Defendant was lawful. 
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CONCLUSION 
K34 We conclude that Wahlin had reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to ask Defendant about drugs. We also conclude that 
Wahlin and Steed's warrantless search of Defendant was lawful. 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's 
motioji^ t^ o^ suppress. 
135 I CONCUR: 
ddith M. Billings, Jr Ju  
Presiding Judge 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
f36 I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that 
the police officers in this case had the required reasonetble, 
articulable suspicion to question Alverez about drugs after 
approaching him in the context of a level two encounter.1 It 
follows that I cannot agree the ensuing search of Alverez's 
person was constitutional. I would reverse the trial court's 
denial of Alverezf s motion to suppress and remand with 
instructions to grant the motion. 
1|37 The majority concludes that the officers had the required 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Alverez had engaged, was 
engaging, or was about to engage in criminal activity to warrant 
1. "While the required level of suspicion is lower than the 
standard required for probable cause . . . the same totality of 
facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there 
are sufficient 'specific and articulable facts1 to support 
reasonable suspicion." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). "[T]he State bears the 
initial burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a[ level two] 
investigative stop." Id. 
1 A 
Alverezfs detention to question him about drugs. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994). Under the majority's view, 
the articulable factual basis the officers had for suspecting 
that Alverez was involved in illegal drug-related activity is 
supported mainly by two pieces of information that originated 
from sources outside of the officers* own observations.2 First, 
the officers had "information" that drug transactions had been 
taking place at the condominium complex where they had observed 
Alverez, two days in a row, make brief visits to the same area of 
the complex. Second, the officers had "information" that 
Alverez's vehicle had possibly been involved in drug 
transactions. However, because the "information" upon which the 
officers based their suspicions originated outside of the 
officers1 own observations, and because the State failed to 
develop any articulable factual basis substantiating this 
"information," the information does not provide a legally 
cognizable factual basis for the officers' suspicions about 
Alverez. Thus, on the record before us, the officers were simply 
not justified in stopping and questioning him about drugs. 
f38 While "[a]n investigative stop may survive the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures if 
performed by an officer who objectively relies on information, 
bulletins, or flyers received from other law enforcement 
sources," it is also well settled that "the legality of a stop 
based on information imparted by another will depend on the 
sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the individual 
originating the information . . . [that is] received and acted 
upon by the investigating officer." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 
1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis in original). See also 
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,11(13-15, 999 P.2d 7 (concluding State 
produced adequate evidence to show police dispatch was based on 
sufficient articulable facts to justify stop); State v. Bruce, 
779 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah 1989) (allowing for "reliance on a 
bulletin issued by other police officers" when bulletin "was 
issued by officers possessing 'a reasonable suspicion justifying 
a stop"1); State v Humphrey, 937 P. 2d 137, 141-42 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (in considering whether information outside of officer's 
own observations forms part of factual basis to support vehicle 
2. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances presented by 
this case, the majority opinion appropriately acknowledges that 
several of the circumstances relied on by the officers as giving 
rise to their suspicions about Alverez were properly given little 
weight by the trial court. For example, the trial court accorded 
little weight to the facsimile of Jesus Malverde, "The Narco 
Saint," which the officers observed in Alverez's vehicle, as well 
as the bottle of water they observed in the vehicle's console. 
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stop, court analyzed "both the content of the information and its 
reliability"). 
1139 In Case, an officer received a dispatch call directing him 
to a specific area to investigate a possible car prowl or car 
burglary. See 884 P.2d at 1275. The dispatcher described the 
suspect as a male in a white tee shirt, possibly Hispanic, with a 
"chunky" build. Id. Based on that information, the officer 
stopped a vehicle leaving the area that was carrying a passenger 
that appeared to fit the description. See id. During the course 
of the officer's stop, he detected an odor of alcohol on the 
breath of the vehicle's driver, whom he subsequently arrested for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol. See id. The 
driver claimed that the officer, acting on the radio dispatch, 
lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop his car and that any 
evidence obtained during the stop was illegal. See id. The 
trial court denied the driver's motion to suppress the evidence, 
but this court reversed the denial of the driver's motion. See 
id. at 1278. Because the State failed to establish any 
reasonable, articulable suspicion underlying the issuance of the 
bulletin, no such suspicion supported making the stop. See id. 
One was left to speculate as to the source of, or the reason for, 
the dispatcher's instruction to the investigating officer. See 
id. In Case, this court held that "[m] erely providing 
descriptive information to an officer about whom to stop, by 
itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are no 
articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop was to be 
made." Id. (emphasis in original). 
1|40 Much like the situation in Case, the officers in this 
instance may or may not have been justified in relying on their 
"information," depending on its basis. Unfortunately, the State 
wholly failed to detail what the information was and how these 
officers came to receive it. See id. at 1276. Thus, the State 
failed to establish that the information about the condominium 
complex and about Alverez's vehicle was based on reliable 
articulable facts. At the suppression hearing, the State was 
required to outline the factual basis known to the individual or 
entity that originated the "information" about the condominium 
complex and Alverez's vehicle, and it was required to show that 
some legally articulable suspicion prompted the transmittal of 
the information in the first place. See id. at 1277-78 n.5 
(stating that "the State becomes obligated, albeit after the 
fact, to show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion 
prompted the issuance of the flyer or dispatch in the first 
place") . The State simply failed in its burden at the 
suppression hearing in this case. 
1[41 Reasonable suspicion cannot be justified by an officer's 
reliance on some sort of amorphous, unexplained "information" 
received from some other, undisclosed source. Therefore, in a 
situation like the instant one, the "reasonable suspicion" 
inquiry is one step removed from the typical inquiry that focuses 
on the articulable factual basis behind a police officer's own 
observations and inferences that give rise to his suspicions of 
illegal activity. Instead, the focus is on the articulable 
factual basis behind the "information" that an officer receives 
from another source if it is to provide the legal basis for 
reasonable suspicion about an individual. 
i|42 The officers in this case began their initial observation of 
the condominium complex solely because of the unexplained 
"information" they had about drug transactions taking place in 
that area. Likewise, they only took an interest in Alverez 
because of the "information" they had that his vehicle had 
possibly been involved in drug transactions.3 In fact, after 
asking Alverez if he knew his vehicle was uninsured, the very 
next thing the officer said to him was that his vehicle was 
suspected of being involved in drug transactions. Then, the 
officers asked Alverez if he was carrying any drugs and if they 
could look in his mouth. Without the "information" tying Alverez 
to illegal drug transactions, the remaining circumstances the 
officers relied on to justify questioning Alverez about his 
involvement in drug trafficking, as well as to justify the 
3. The pivotal role of the underlying factual basis for the 
mysterious information can easily be understood with a couple of 
examples. If the "information" was a radio report from a 
narcotics officer who had been working undercover, and who had 
participated in controlled buys at the condominium complex and 
from a person who had retrieved the drugs from the vehicle 
Alverez was driving, there would be a sound basis for the 
information, and the suspicions of the officers who confronted 
Alverez would be deemed warranted. Just the opposite is true if 
the "information" was (1) a report from one of the officers' 
wives that she had golfed with a friend whose husband used to 
work as a realtor and he had always said there was "a lot of 
hanky-panky in the condos and apartments south of 21st South" and 
(2) an admonition from the shift sergeant that "Hispanic men 
driving around with a water bottle in the console is gonna mean 
drugs 90% of the time." The problem, then, is a failure of proof 
by the State at the suppression hearing. Not all "information" 
passed along to police officers is of equal validity. The State 
had the burden to explain what this "information" was and where 
it came from. Whether or not it constituted a reasonable, 
articulable basis for suspicion is simply not known in the 
absence of such proof. 
20040059-CA 17 
subsequent warrantless search of Alverez's mouth, wholly fail to 
provide an articulable factual basis for the officers' actions.4 
f43 The only circumstances left to justify any encounter between 
Alverez and the officers was the officers1 knowledge that 
Alverez's vehicle was uninsured, the officers' observations of 
the picture of Jesus Malverde and the water bottle in Alverez's 
vehicle, Alverez's two visits to the complex, and Alverezfs 
nervous behavior when confronted by police. Such circumstances, 
however, do not give the officers the required reasonable 
suspicion to detain Alverez and question him about drugs. 
£j5€rtJory K. 0rme7 Judge 
4. Without the "information" about Alverez's vehicle or the 
condominium complex, his two repeat visits to the same complex 
are relatively innocuous. A dutiful nephew with a limited lunch 
break might make a brief, daily visit to his invalid aunt's 
condominium, just to check in on her. That visit by itself would 
not justify the reasonable suspicion that he is involved in some 
type of criminal activity at the condominium complex. 
Nevertheless, if the same type of brief visit to a condominium 
complex was coupled with reliable information that the targeted 
individual is a known drug dealer and that the complex is a drug 
haven, it might more appropriately give rise to reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. The key inquiry in this context, 
however, would be about the articulable, factual basis behind the 
"information" that he is a drug dealer and that the condominium 
complex is a drug haven. 
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ADDENDUM B 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH . ™ * 1 2005 
00O00—-— 
State of Utah, 
Appellee and Respondent 
v. Case No. 20050468-SC 
20040059-CA 
Ernesto Alverez, 
Appellant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on May 23, 2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the totality of the circumstances in this case 
created a reasonable articulable suspicion if criminal 
activity to detain the defendant. 
2. Whether the totality of the circumstances at the time 
The police officers conducted their sear ch in this 
case demonstrated probable cause for that search. 
3. Whether the officers employed reasonable force to 
obtain evidence from the defendant's mouth in this 
case. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date ' ^ Michael J. Wi^kfns 
Associate Chief Justice 
ADDRNDUMC 
niNMTITII ' l IN fill U'i« Il Ill-: IIINi'TKJj STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures,] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds, 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
pris attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
